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ABSTRACT 
Expropriation through Related Party Transaction (RPT) has been identified as one of 
the key factors that led to the collapse of several firms globally. Hence, its regulation 
becomes necessary. This study examines the extent and the determinants of 
compliance with the disclosure requirements on RPTs by Malaysian listed firms. It 
also investigates the value-relevance of Malaysian Financial Reporting Standard 
(MFRS) 124 adoption, real earnings management (REM) in RPTs and the moderating 
effect of compliance with MFRS 124 on the relationship between REM in RPTs and 
firm value. The study uses the data collected from the firms with significant RPTs 
from 2009 to 2015. Findings from the weighted disclosure index indicate a moderate 
level of compliance with MFRS 124. Furthermore, the regression results reveal that 
board independence, audit committee financial expertise, family ownership, 
managerial ownership and firm growth have significant positive relationships with the 
compliance of MFRS 124. Moreover, the study documents that RPTs disclosure is 
value-relevant. Findings of price model provide evidence that with the adoption of 
MFRS 124, capital market participants value the EPS of the RPT firms over its BVPS. 
The study documents that firms use RPTs to perpetrate REM. The results of the 
Roychowdhury models show that RPTs firms are characterized by low cash flow from 
operations, high production costs and low discretionary expenditures. It is also 
established that capital market discounts the stock price of firms that perpetrate REM 
in RPTs. Also, compliance with disclosure requirements on RPTs mitigates the 
negative relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value. The study reveals the 
need for the relevant authorities to increase the level of enforcement to achieve full 
compliance which will result to increase transparency of financial reporting and 
investor protection. The results of this study contribute to the agency, resource 
dependency and capital market theories. 
 
Keywords: compliance, corporate governance mechanisms, firm financial 
characteristics, firm value, real earnings management, value-relevance. 
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ABSTRAK 
Pengambilalihan melalui Transaksi Pihak Berkaitan (RPT) telah dikenalpasti sebagai 
salah satu faktor utama yang menyebabkan keruntuhan beberapa firma di seluruh 
dunia. Oleh itu, peraturannya menjadi keperluan. Kajian ini mengkaji sejauh mana dan 
penentu kepatuhan terhadap keperluan pendedahan kepada RPT oleh firma yang 
disenaraikan di Malaysia. Ia juga mengkaji nilai-relevan Piawaian Pelaporan 
Kewangan Malaysia (MFRS) 124, pengurusan pendapatan sebenar (REM) dalam RPT 
dan kesan penyesuaian pematuhan dengan MFRS 124 mengenai hubungan antara 
REM dalam RPT dan nilai firma. Kajian ini menggunakan data yang dikumpulkan 
dari firma dengan RPT yang signifikan dari tahun 2009 hingga 2015. Penemuan dari 
indeks penzahiran berwajaran menunjukkan tahap pematuhan yang sederhana dengan 
MFRS 124. Tambahan pula, hasil regresi menunjukkan kebebasan lembaga, 
kepakaran kewangan jawatankuasa audit, pemilikan keluarga , pemilikan pengurus 
dan pertumbuhan firma mempunyai hubungan positif yang signifikan dengan 
pematuhan MFRS 124. Selain itu, kajian mendokumenkan pendedahan RPT adalah 
nilai yang relevan. Penemuan model harga menunjukkan bukti bahawa dengan 
penggunaan MFRS 124, peserta pasaran modal menilai EPS firma RPT ke atas 
BVPSnya (nilai buku sesaham). Dokumen kajian mendapati firma menggunakan RPT 
untuk melakukan REM. Hasil model Roychowdhury menunjukkan bahawa firma RPT 
dicirikan dengan aliran tunai yang rendah dari operasi, biaya pengeluaran yang tinggi 
dan perbelanjaan budi bicara yang rendah. Ia juga mendapati bahawa pasaran modal 
mendiskaun harga saham firma yang terlibat dalam REM melalui RPT. Selain itu, 
pematuhan terhadap keperluan pendedahan mengenai RPT mengurangkan hubungan 
negatif antara REM dalam RPT dan nilai firma. Kajian itu mendedahkan keperluan 
pihak berkuasa yang berkaitan untuk meningkatkan tahap penguatkuasaan untuk 
mencapai pematuhan penuh yang akan menyebabkan peningkatan ketelusan pelaporan 
kewangan dan perlindungan pelabur. Hasil kajian ini menyumbang kepada agensi, 
ketergantungan sumber dan teori pasaran modal. 
 
Kata kunci: pematuhan, mekanisma tadbir urus korporat, ciri-ciri kewangan firma, 
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This chapter highlights the contemporary issues pertaining related party transactions 
(RPTs), corporate disclosure and RPTs disclosure regulations across the world in the 
background of the study. The chapter explains the problem statements, research 
questions and objectives of the study. Other headings in the chapter are scope of the 
study, significance of the study and organization of the thesis. 
1.1 Background of the Study 
Corporate monitoring, financial transparency and reporting quality have been among 
the major concerns of policymakers in many nations across the globe (Sierra García, 
Ruiz Barbadillo, & Orta Pérez, 2012). The collapse of giant corporations like 
WorldCom and Enron in the United State, Nortel in Canada, Equitable Life Assurance 
Society in the United Kingdom, Parmalat in Europe, China Aviation Oil in Singapore 
and alike have pushed political and business leaders to put much interest in regaining 
and sustaining public trust in capital market (Bauwhede & Willekens, 2008). Since the 
collapse of these giant corporations, many studies were conducted to find the tool and 
incentives behind the earnings management practices by the firm and provide possible 
solution accordingly Xiao (2015). Abusive related party transactions are identified as 
the key issues that led to the collapse of many multinational corporations such as 
Adelphia, Enron and Tyco (Munir, Saleh, Jaffar, & Yatim, 2013). Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2009) claims that the biggest 
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Appendix A 
Related Party Transactions Disclosure (MFRS 124) Checklist  
Paragraph Sub- 
paragraph 
MFRS 124 Related Party Disclosures  
13  Relationships between a parent and its subsidiaries 
shall be disclosed irrespective of whether there have 
been transactions between them. An entity shall 
disclose the name of its parent and, if different, the 
ultimate controlling party. If neither the entity’s parent 
nor the ultimate controlling party produces 
consolidated financial statements available for public 
use, the name of the next most senior parent that does 
so shall also be disclosed. 
√ 
14  To enable users of financial statements to form a view 
about the effects of related party relationships on an 
entity, it is appropriate to disclose the related party 
relationship when control exists, irrespective of 
whether there have been transactions between the 
related parties. 
 
 (a) Percentage of ownership √ 
17  An entity shall disclose key management personnel 
compensation in total and for each of the following 
categories: 
 
 (a) Short-term employee benefits; √ 
 (b) Post-employment benefits; √ 
 (c) Other long-term benefits; √ 
 (d) Termination benefits; and √ 
 (e) Share-based payment. √ 
18  If an entity has had related party transactions during 
the periods covered by the financial statements, it shall 
disclose the nature of the related party relationship as 
well as information about those transactions and 
outstanding balances, including commitments, 
necessary for users to understand the potential effect 
of the relationship on the financial statements. These 
disclosure requirements are in addition to those in 
paragraph 17. At a minimum, disclosures shall 
include: 
 
 (a) The amount of the transactions; √ 
 (b) The amount of outstanding balances; √ 
 (c) Their terms and conditions; √ 
 (d) Whether they are secured; √ 
 (e) Details of any guarantees given or received; √ 
 (f) Provisions for doubtful debts related to the amount of 
outstanding balances; 
√ 
 (g) The expense recognised during the period in respect of 
bad or doubtful debts due from related parties. 
√ 
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19  The disclosures required by paragraph 18 shall be 
made separately for each of the following categories: 
√ 
 (a) The parent;  
 (b) Entities with joint control or significant influence over 
the entity; 
 
 (c) Subsidiaries;  
 (d) Associates;  
 (e) Joint ventures in which the entity is a venturer;  
 (f) Key management personnel of the entity or its parent; 
and 
 
 (g) Other related parties.  
20  The classification of amounts payable to, and 
receivable from, related parties in the different 
categories as required in paragraph 19 
√ 
23  Disclosures that related party transactions were made 
on terms equivalent to those that prevail in arm’s 
length transactions are made only if such terms can be 
substantiated. 
√ 
 
 
